



Lessons from Ontario’s Troubled Experiment in 




Eco-fees have proved to be a political disaster. Good governance 
and attention to program participants’ incentives could produce 
better results.
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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONCharging for the life cycle cost of waste management is contentious. The recent example of
some retailers charging “eco-fees” in Ontario, with respect to sales of household products such
as detergent, batteries and fluorescent light bulbs, is a case in point. However, the Ontario
program for municipal waste, which the provincial government has partially abandoned, is
just one example of the movement known as Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR),
which is spreading across the country and to many products. As in numerous other
jurisdictions, Canadian provinces have imposed, or are considering, similar EPR programs
for products such as tires, electronics and countless other goods.
This Commentary uses lessons from Ontario’s waste programs to examine EPR’s potential
attractions – when such programs are properly designed. 
Policymakers in Ontario and other provinces that are considering implementing EPR
programs should implement systems that impose responsibility for dealing with waste on
individual producers, and allow for a range of contractual arrangements to undertake these
responsibilities. The underlying governance structures are central to the effectiveness,
efficiency, and fairness of EPR programs, but are often neglected or poorly designed.
EPR programs need not suffer the fate of the failed Ontario hazardous waste program.
Policymakers can make these programs work through better institutional design, such as by
setting realistic waste diversion targets, increasing competition among individual and
collective waste diversion systems set up by producers, ensuring balanced representation
between industry, environmental groups, and the public on the boards of waste diversion
programs, and providing inducements to consumers to participate in the EPR program.
Failure on these criteria may lead to unnecessary costs for consumers, with perhaps little
environmental benefit.
ABOUTTHE INSTITUTE
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. The
Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by policy
staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s individual and
corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across the country.









in Law and Economics,
University Professor 
and Professor of Law,
University of Toronto.
Rigorous external review 
of every major policy study,
undertaken by academics 
and outside experts, helps
ensure the quality,
integrity and objectivity 





THE STUDY IN BRIEFCommentary 316 | 1
P
aying for the cost of waste
management is becoming
increasinglycontentious.Witness
the recent controversy in Ontario
over “eco-fees” for household
hazardous waste such as detergent,
batteries and fertilizers. 
The Ontario government implemented its plan to
make producers pay for a share of a program to
address such waste on July 1, 2010. It had hoped
the plan would lead producers to reduce waste
from their products by, for example, making their
components more recyclable or reusable.
However, public outcry over the imposition of
fees relating to this plan by some retailers led the
government to suspend and eventually to scrap
the program. Yet, the difficulty was not in the
concept of making producers more responsible
but in the institutions and structure of the policy
that Ontario implemented. This Commentary uses
the lessons from Ontario’s waste programs to
examine why the idea of imposing responsibility
on producers is attractive and how such programs
can be structured more effectively.
While controversial, governments around the
world are extending similar programs to a wide
range of products from electronics to cars, tires,
and appliances. Waste has long seemed a natural
by-product of human activity. In a market
economy, producers make goods that they sell to
consumers who, in turn, use and dispose of the
goods and their packaging. Such a system
obviously has costs – the direct costs of collecting
and disposing of the waste and indirect costs such
as the environmental effects of hazzardous waste
and the waste of the resources that could have
been used for other purposes. To the extent that
producers and consumers do not fully bear these
costs, they shift (or externalize) some of them
onto others.
Governments around the world are attempting
to shift responsibility for the costs of waste from
municipalities and taxpayers to those who create
or generate it, often through programs called
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR). They
hope that EPR programs will provide incentives
for producers to design their products in a manner
more conducive to recycling or reuse and to
promote more efficient and innovative forms of
waste services. Much of the rhetoric surrounding
EPR may be good politics, but there is little
public (or industry) understanding of what is at
stake in the expansion of EPR to an ever-wider
range of products, as reflected in the recent public
controversy in Ontario over “eco-fees” (widely
perceived and described as new taxes) for common
hazardous household products. 
In this Commentary, we conclude that the best
system is one that imposes individual
responsibility to the greatest extent possible and
allows for a range of contractual arrangements to
undertake these responsibilities. We argue,
however, that the underlying governance
structures are central to the effectiveness,
efficiency, and fairness of the program but are
often neglected or poorly designed. We
recommend that:
￿ Governments should set targets (such as for
diversion rates) based to the extent possible on a
cost-benefit analysis of target levels and through a
transparent process;
￿ Governments should allow both individual and
collective programs to operate concurrently and,
to the maximum extent feasible, use individualized
producer payments;
￿ The system should provide inducements for
consumers to participate in end-of-product-life
collection/recycling functions;
￿ The system should encourage as much competition
as possible in the provision of collection/recycling
services; and
￿ The governance system adopted should ensure a
balanced representation of interests (including
industry, environmental groups, and the public)
and transparent processes for setting, monitoring,
and enforcing policies by the decisionmaking
bodies. 
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Assessing EPR Programs
The traditional view of the end of life of products
– at least for those of residential use
1 – is as waste,
collected by municipalities and disposed of in
landfills, often municipally operated and financed
by local taxpayers. Under the EPR approach,
however, responsibility for waste management
would initially fall partly or completely on the
producer, rather than the municipality or
taxpayers. As the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) explains,
EPR is “an environmental policy approach under
which the responsibility of producers for their
products and packaging is extended to include the
social costs of waste management, including the
environmental impact of waste disposal” (OECD
2005). The core concept is that the producer takes
into account the costs of the end stages of the life 
of its product, whether by disposal, recycling, or
reuse (Figure 1). In theory, the producer then
would have a financial incentive to reduce these
end-stage costs just as it has for production costs. 
EPR programs have now spread to more than
25 countries (Khetriwal, Kraeuchi, and Widmer
C.D. Howe Institute
1 The other large category of waste is industrial, commercial, and institutional. Such waste is covered by regulations under the Environmental
Protection Act that require generators to audit their waste, develop waste reduction plans, and separate recyclables (Ontario Ministry of the
Environment 2009).
Figure 1: The Product Life Cycle 
Source: Association of Municipalities of Ontario.  Commentary 316 | 3
2009),
2 including Canada, where the Canadian
Council of Ministers of the Environment (2009)
has committed Canadian jurisdictions to working
toward the implementation of EPR programs
within six years for packaging, printed materials,
mercury containing lamps and other products,
electronics and electronic products, household
hazardous and special wastes, and automotive
products; and within eight years for construction
materials, demolition materials, furniture, textiles,
carpets, and appliances. A number of provinces
also have product-specific EPR programs 
(see Table 1). Ontario, for example, has developed
programs relating to packaging and printed paper,
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
2 One of the first was a 1991 German law that required producers and retailers to take back packaging and set recycling rates for the returned
packaging (Walls 2006). The European Union now requires member states to establish systems to meet recycling targets. EU members have
tended to address these targets through EPR programs covering such products as used motor oil, packaging, used tires, batteries, and waste
electrical and electronic equipment (European Union 2008). EPR has also spread to countries in Asia. South Korea, for example, has an EPR
program that covers a range of products including tires, lubricants, fluorescent lights, metal cans, waste electrical and electronic equipment,
and packaging. Japan has programs that cover vehicles and appliances (Walls 2006).
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Table 1: Founding Date and Status of EPR Programs in Canada
Sources: Canada 2007; Container Recycling Institute 2009; Moyes 2010; Ontario 2010; SWEEP 2010.| 4 Commentary 316
waste electrical and electronic equipment, used
tires, and household hazardous waste,
3 and plans
to extend EPR to a wider range of goods and
implement mandatory waste diversion
requirements (Ontario 2009). 
The Potential Benefits of EPR
An expanded role for producers in the waste
management process is thought to lead to a 
range of benefits relating to the whole life cycle
of a product that stem from forcing producers
and consumers to face the “externality,” or costs,
they impose on other parties as a result of their
production and consumption activities (Sachs
2006). The efficacy of EPR programs heavily
depends, however, on the policy choices that 
are made in their design, objectives, and
implementation – many have been criticized as a
costly and cumbersome way of achieving their
goals.
4 To understand these policy choices, it is
instructive to look at three broad goals of EPR: to
reduce environmental harm, reduce costs, and
increase the fairness of the distribution of costs.
5
Reducing Environmental Harm
Two broad environmental benefits have been
claimed for EPR. First, EPR might reduce the
impact of production on the environment to the
extent that it gave producers incentives to reduce
waste, say, by using less packaging, and increased
recycling and reuse.  Further, to the extent that
EPR either reduced the amount or toxicity of
waste (such as by reducing levels of packaging or
levels of hazardous waste in products) or increased
recycling and reuse, there would be fewer landfill
sites holding waste from which pollution could
flow, and fewer hazardous materials going into
landfills or being incinerated. Second, EPR 
might reduce the need to obtain and process 
new materials as reuse and recycling increases;
moreover reuse and recycling may require 




EPR could reduce the financial costs of dealing
with waste through the incentives it imposes on
producers, fostering what economists call static
and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency is the
minimization of costs given existing technology
and institutions (Dewees 2009). In the case of
EPR, if producers were forced to pay the cost of
waste management, they would have an incentive
to reduce the amount of waste they produce. They
would also have an incentive to ensure that
whatever systems were in place for managing
waste were as efficient as possible. Dynamic
efficiency refers to innovation in new technologies
or organizational arrangements that reduces costs
over time (Dewees 2009). This innovation can
occur at all stages of the life cycle of a product.
Proponents of EPR argue that it would enhance
“design for the environment” – that is, design
would take into account the whole life cycle of the
product through to its after-life management,
including recycling and reuse. 
EPR programs, however, can come with
potential inefficiencies. One is high transaction
costs – such as the cost of setting up the program,
7
the cost to industry to comply with requirements
(such as sorting different waste streams or
products), the cost to government and industry of
monitoring compliance, and the cost of
enforcement. While some of the transaction costs
C.D. Howe Institute
3  These programs fall under Ontario’s Waste Diversion Act, 2002 (Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2009).
4  For discussions of the concerns with EPR, see, for example, OECD (2005); Sachs (2006); Walls (2006); Binkley (2009); Dewees (2009); and
Trebilcock (2009).
5  For a discussion of criteria for evaluating policy, see Revesz and  Stavins (forthcoming).
6  Ontario (2009); but see Sachs (2006), who argues that it is not clear that less energy is used in the recycling and reuse of some materials.
7 This includes the cost of negotiating the program between the government and the various actors, the cost of negotiating any contracts
between or among parties under the program, and the cost of the government’s obtaining information to establish regulatory targets (such as
collection and recycling rates).Commentary 316 | 5
might be merely shifted to the EPR program from
elsewhere, the additional costs of EPR can be
extremely high depending on the products
involved and the structure of the relevant market.
Another potential inefficiency of an EPR program
is the risk that it will encourage anti-competitive
behaviour. Depending on how the program is set
up, firms might impede competition by, for
example, banding together to form an association
that exercises power as the single or dominant 
buyer in downstream markets for collection, 
reuse, and recycling.
A third potential inefficiency is the cost of
program inconsistency across jurisdictions. Some
jurisdictions might impose stringent requirements,
some lenient, some simply different rules. Such
differences can influence the market share of
different producers because of their different costs
of dealing with waste. It also might be difficult 
for producers to engage in eco-design if faced 
with multiple compliance requirements in
different markets. 
Increasing Fairness 
Neither environmental effectiveness nor economic
efficiency in general takes into account who bears
the costs or receives the benefits of an EPR
program. In changing the focus of responsibility,
however, an EPR program, regardless of its other
benefits, might distribute the costs of
environmental harm more fairly by making the
polluter pay for the costs of disposal up front
while recognizing that some or all of these costs
might be passed on to consumers (as with any
other production cost), depending on elasticities
of demand and supply in the relevant product
market. This is a way to ensure that those who
benefit from the production and consumption of
the product – that is, both the producer and
consumer – also pay the costs. 
The Challenge of Design Choice
A good EPR program is thus one that reduces
environmental harm, reduces costs, and increases
fairness. However, the transaction costs – in
particular, the information costs – of particular
designs require choices that involve tradeoffs
among these goals.
One way to address the environmental impact
of products is for producers to take account of
both the direct and indirect costs of their products
and production processes (such as of
environmental harm from disposal). If they were
to incorporate these costs in the same way as costs
for labour or materials, they would have an
incentive to reduce them by changing processes
and materials to gain an advantage in the market.
The difficulty, of course, lies in appropriately
pricing all the various harms that might arise from
processes and products and apportioning them to
each producer.
One solution would be for producers to face
individual targets for amounts of products to be
recycled or reused. They could be given the
flexibility to determine how best to meet these
targets, including through combining efforts
where economies of scale favour this option. If the
targets were mandatory and backed by penalties,
producers again would face at least a part of the
cost of the end of life of their product. This cost
could be included in the costs of production and
passed on in whole or in part to consumers as
with any other costs. Consumers could then
choose among products based on cost, including
the cost of their end of life, which, in turn, would
give producers an incentive to take further steps
such as increasing recycling or reducing
packaging. Such competition would drive both
static and dynamic efficiency in both goods
production and waste management services.
As governments design EPR programs, they face
several key choices:
￿ What are the program’s goals and how are 
they to be set?
￿ What are the specifics of the program’s design? 
For example, who will be responsible for meeting
targets? How will the program be financed? Do
consumers have an incentive to participate? How
are collection and recycling services provided?
￿ Who decides how the program is designed and
implemented?
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute | 6 Commentary 316
Setting Goals 
In a world of perfect information, the solution to
environmental costs arising from waste would be
to impose the appropriate price on those who
created the harm. The government would merely
need to determine the cost of the harm and
impose a tax that forced the producer to
internalize the cost. The producer then would
make the appropriate production and waste
management decisions taking into account all
relevant costs.
8
In the real world, however, information is
always lacking, and governments cannot impose
the perfect tax. Thus, in designing EPR programs,
they turn instead to quantity targets, which
require someone (for example, individual
producers) to divert a certain percentage of waste
to recycling. In order to ensure efficiency and
environmental effectiveness, these targets need to
be set bearing in mind the marginal costs and
benefits of taking action, and should be adopted
only if the benefits they provide justify the costs.
9
One difficulty with such rational planning is
that there is often not enough information about,
say, the costs and benefits of meeting particular
recycling targets or the actual impact on the
environment of increasing levels of particular
forms of recycling. Further, parties might possess
significantly different information – industry, for
example, might know more than government
about the potential costs of changing product
design or recovering materials.
10 Rational
planning, based on cost-benefit analysis, often also
does not take into account equity concerns: the
optimal waste-reduction policy might impose a
heavy cost on low-income individuals.
While it is crucial to set policies based on the
best understanding of costs and benefits, these
difficulties point to the impossibility of doing so
on a completely technocratic basis. Moreover, the
process of setting targets gives rise to a principal-
agent problem: the risk of divergence between the
interests of the principals (in this case, citizens)
and the policy goals chosen by the agents (the
legislators or regulators) whereby the principals
have difficulty monitoring or controlling the
agents. Legislators, for example, could attempt to
satisfy the preferences of citizens but be mistaken
about the nature of those preferences.
Alternatively, legislators could attempt to impose
their own view of the social good, irrespective of
the preferences of citizens. Finally, and most
malignly, legislators or regulators might not
attempt to increase social welfare at all but instead
aim at furthering their own self-interest by, say,
granting favours to concentrated interests in the
hope of future benefits (such as campaign
contributions or future job opportunities) or
increasing their prestige. 
Fortunately, there are solutions to such
principal-agent problems. One of the most
important is transparency. A government will have
greater success in achieving targets if it sets them
using the best information it can obtain and uses
open processes fostering accountability for the
resulting decisions. Unfortunately, when it comes
to diversion or recycling rates, the processes
governments typically use to set goals seem quite
opaque. Often, the goals seem to have the
C.D. Howe Institute
8 For example, Germany’s end-of-life vehicle (ELV) program, despite the increasing portion of recyclable components now incorporated into
vehicles, yields a net environmental detriment. The ELV Directive requires that 95 percent of plastic on cars be recycled, but recycling plastic
is expensive. Therefore, manufacturers have chosen to reduce the amount of plastic in new cars by replacing it with metal, which is heavier
and decreases fuel efficiency. Furthermore, such plastic recycling as does take place involves greater energy and physical inputs than those
used in producing from virgin inputs. In short, not only is the Directive’s 95 percent recycling rate not socially optimal, it is potentially
thermodynamically impossible (Binkley 2008).
9 The United Nations Environmental Programme (2009) has released a guideline for rational and transparent target setting when developing
integrated waste management plans. The guideline illustrates requirements for sound targets such as specificity, measurability, and
achievability. It also outlines a target-setting process, including mathematical formulas to reach the desired outcome.
10 Governments at times have attempted to set “stretch” goals – goals that industry argues are impossible or too expensive – to try to force
industry to make ambitious efforts.Commentary 316 | 7
superficial attraction of round numbers – increase
diversion rates by 50 percent over five years – and
it is not clear whether they represent a careful
analysis of the marginal social benefits and costs of
abatement measures, or are simply the result of
horse trading between governments and various
stakeholder groups, or are pulled out of the air by
politicians or bureaucrats for their sound-bite
value. Without a clear and transparent analytical
foundation, there exists no firm means of
evaluating whether the goals are efficient in
themselves or have been achieved efficiently. 
Program Design 
A range of questions typically is addressed in any
discussion of EPR program design. First, should
there be individual or collective responsibility for
meeting goals or targets set out by legislation or
regulation?
If individual producers are to be responsible, a
number of alternative arrangements are possible
(see van Rossem, Tojo, and Lindhqvist 2006).
One is individual physical responsibility, whereby
a producer undertakes end-of-life (EOL)
processing of the good in-house instead of merely
providing the financing to ensure that the good is
recycled. Such schemes are rare, however, because
they tend to be inefficient and costly.
11 Another
arrangement is individual financial responsibility,
under which each producer contracts with third
parties to collect, sort, transport, and process EOL
goods.
12
Individual EPR creates incentives for
competition among producers to meet targets and
to do so at a lower cost. This, in turn, induces
“design for the environment” because producers
who, for example, include higher levels of
recyclable materials in their products might be
able to meet their targets at lower cost. Design for
disassembly also makes EOL processing more
efficient.
13 The disadvantage of individual EPR
systems is that, if each manufacturer is only a
small portion of the market and each contracts
out separately, there might be significant
inefficiencies from failing to take advantage of
economies of scale (Walls 2006; Binkley 2008).
Transaction costs can also increase through, for
example, the cost of sorting by brand after
collection, unlike in collective systems, where all
brands are processed together (Sachs 2006). As
well, orphaned goods whose manufacturers have
gone out of business, and historical goods that
were manufactured before EPR was implemented,
are problematic to the extent that their collection
and management use resources that would
otherwise be used for non-orphaned waste.
Under collective responsibility programs, some
collective body – often called a Producer
Responsibility Organization (PRO) – contracts for
collection, sorting, transportation, and processing
either jointly or separately depending on the
market structure and the type of good.
14 A PRO
can be formed by individual companies to meet
EPR targets collectively and are usually organized
by product.
15 In competitive markets, it is also
possible for waste service providers to form a PRO
that can handle a variety of products. A PRO
pools financial responsibility where it is funded
based on market share of sales and where targets
are set for the good or for the PRO as a whole,
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
11 One example is Jura, a Swiss manufacturer of coffee makers, that arranges to have its appliances returned to be remanufactured 
(see Tojo 2003; SENS 2010).
12 Producers can contract with different parties for each of these four services or combine them depending on the complexity of the EOL 
process for a particular good. Some authors claim that the first form of contracting creates more incentives for designing car components for
reuse since the primary contracting party is the disassembler. They also claim that the second scheme incentivizes the reuse of metal (Binkley
2008). However, in a world without transaction costs, contracts would be made with the most efficient party, and it should make no
difference whether the contract is with the disassembler or the shredder.
13 An example of such design is the grill on the front of BMW autos, which previously required time-intensive disassembly but which now
consists of two plastic pieces that can simply be unclipped (Binkley 2008).
14 For instance, more complex goods such as computers are likely to require specialized techniques to disassemble safely and therefore require
more parties, such as providers of disassembling services, than does cardboard packaging.
15 In South Korea, for example, there are 11 PROs, one for each category of goods covered by EPR (Asian Development Bank 2006).| 8 Commentary 316
rather than for individual producers. If the
municipality or local authority remains involved
in the process, it is likely to be at the collection
stage and potentially also at the sorting stage –
which is much less onerous under collective
responsibility than under individual responsibility
because the former does not require that goods be
sorted by brand, but only by materials category
(Walls 2006). 
The main advantage of any PRO system is that
it exploits economies of scale by giving a central
body the responsibility of contracting for the
disposal of greater volumes of product (Khetriwal,
Kraeuchi, and Widmer 2009). Also, collective
systems are much better equipped than individual
systems to handle historical and orphaned goods,
as they can simply be processed with the rest of
the goods.
16 On the other hand, if producers in a
collective system all pay the same, regardless of
innovations they make toward environmental
sustainability, incentives to “design for the
environment” can be significantly weakened
(Asian Development Bank 2006).   
While collective forms of EPR can generate
some static efficiency gains, particularly where
there are significant economies of scale in
collection, sorting, or recycling, the key question
is how much is lost in terms of dynamic efficiency
(or innovation incentives), especially in a small
jurisdiction that might have limited leverage over
the design of products manufactured for and
supplied to much larger geographic markets. This
tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency is
highly dependent on particular product and waste
stream characteristics, and in this respect it is
difficult to see how to avoid highly context-
specific analysis if one is to develop any firm
judgments about the magnitude of these tradeoffs. 
The choice of collective versus individual EPR
likely depends on the market for the particular
waste stream. In a competitive system, the fees and
the form of collective versus individual action are
left to market participants. Every individual
producer is responsible for meeting mandated
targets and goals, but can do so either individually
or by participating in a collective scheme. In this
system, a producer might belong to a PRO to
benefit from the economies of scale to be realized
when all goods are processed together. The PRO
might be funded by individualized fees paid by
producers that are specific to the brand of good,
which would create stronger individual financial
incentives than in the fully shared system, where
fees are paid without regard to the qualities of the
specific product. If there is competition between
PROs, fee structures might be designed differently
to take account of different product characteristics.
How effectively such a system works depends in
part on its general governance structure, including
the transparency, objectivity, and credibility of any
government oversight or target setting.
Making Producers Bear the Costs
If producers are made to bear the full cost of an
item’s use and EOL handling, they are likely to
have incentives to “design for the environment”
and improve the handling of products at the end
of their life; efficiency and fairness would also
mean including the cost of disposing parts that are
not recycled (Ontario 2010). These costs can then
be embedded in the price of the product and
passed, in whole or in part, on to the consumer,
depending on supply and demand conditions in
the market for the product. Municipalities or local
authorities also might be responsible for some
portion of the EOL process, such as collection,
transportation, or sorting (Walls 2006), and receive
payment from producers either under contract or
by government regulation. However, to the extent
that taxpayers share the burden through the
involvement of their local authority, incentives are
C.D. Howe Institute
16 For example, in Switzerland, the EOL processing cost of orphaned goods, as with any other good, is paid at the time of purchase and can be
simply added as a percentage to the market share calculations in producer-funded systems (Khetriwal, Kraeuchi, and Widmer 2009).Commentary 316 | 9
reduced for manufacturers to produce goods in an
environmentally sustainable way. 
Some (mixed) forms of EPR aim to combine
the advantages of individual financing through
enhancing incentives to “design for the
environment” with the scale effects of combining
efforts with other producers. The financing
portion of mixed responsibility arrangements can
be designed in one of two ways: first, individual
producer targets can be laid out by statute or
regulation, and producers then pay for each unit
that is processed through a PRO; or, second,
overall goals can be set for the industry, and the
PRO then devises an individualized fee scheme to
hold producers responsible for their products
(Walls 2006). The first method might require
brand sorting and detailed reporting requirements
by the PRO to ensure that it is charging producers
the correct amount. The second method is much
easier to implement on a practical level but its
effectiveness depends on how the fee is calculated:
the more precisely the fee can approximate the
recyclability of a good, the greater is the incentive
to “design for the environment” (Asian
Development Bank 2006). 
Further, an individualized system can be
extremely costly. Costs could be apportioned not
just according to product category, or even by
producer within the category, but by models sold
by each producer as they may have very different
components (Sachs 2006).  The cost of such
apportionment would in many cases be
prohibitive. In practice, therefore, most EPR
programs entail per unit fees often by product. 
The central dilemma in the design of EPR
programs, however, is that, while collective
implementation might achieve economies of scale
and minimize transaction costs, the less
individualized is the fee structure, the weaker are
the incentives for any particular producer to
“design for the environment.” As the choices are so
dependent on the particular product and
product/waste market, individual market
participants, including producers and waste service
providers, should decide how to resolve these
tradeoffs in each case. If there is a clear target for
recycling levels for each producer, producers
should be able to decide if it is worth the cost to
separate out their own products or act collectively.
How Should Consumers Be Involved?
Consumers can be included in an EPR system in
two principal ways. First, the cost of the recovery
and recycling and management of a product can
be included in its price, inducing individuals to
change their patterns of demand. The price,
however, must reflect these costs. Across the board
per unit fees regardless of the environmental
impact of particular products would create
different incentives than prices that were tailored
more closely to the actual environmental
properties of the products.  Second, consumers
can be involved in the collection process, as when
consumers do a preliminary sorting of materials
that are collected at the curbside or drop off waste
at a collection centre. Usually, such disposal is
free, as fees tend to create an incentive to dump
illegally (Khetriwal, Kraeuchi, and Widmer 2009),
although even free dropoff entails a cost to the
consumer in terms of time, effort, and, likely, fuel
(Nakajima and Vandergurg 2005). 
To engage consumers, many programs rely
solely on moral suasion and education combined
with attempts to lower the cost of involvement by,
for example, establishing more convenient
collection points. Others programs, such as
deposit-refund schemes, offer consumers financial
incentives to return products.
17 
The Role of Competition 
Imposing collection and recycling targets and
allowing producers to meet them in the most cost-
efficient manner should promote competition that
leads to static and dynamic efficiency, although
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standards would need to be set to ensure that
waste was managed in an environmentally
desirable manner.
Competition might be reduced, however, if a
program establishes a single or dominant supplier
– say, a municipality that provides collection.
18
In that event, the monopoly supplier of
particular waste services might exercise its market
power as sole or dominant purchaser in
downstream markets for collection, reuse, and
recycling, enter into long-term exclusive contracts
with downstream parties that impede entry by
more competitive suppliers, or deny access to
these services by upstream parties that are not
members of the PRO (European Union 2005).
19
As a result, while individual producers should be
permitted to decide whether to meet their targets
individually or together, when they act together
they should be subject to the requirements of the
Canadian Competition Act.
Who Decides? The Governance 
Problem in EPR Programs
The allocation of responsibilities among
government, independent agencies, and PROs,
and the governance arrangements for each is
crucial to the success of any EPR program. 
A government might delegate the power to
design or implement an EPR program to another
body such as a PRO because it lacks the expertise,
time, or information that such a nongovernmental
body might have. Producers, for example, know
more about the nature of the relevant markets,
and about the substances and processes used to
make particular products. A government also
might wish to pass on the costs of regulation to
producers.
The decisionmaking bodies can be more or less
independent of government.  Independence might
be desirable if there is concern that decisions would
be subject to government whims. It can be
enhanced through fixed terms for members, limits
on legislative or executive control over the structure
or processes of the body, limited executive or
legislative review of policy decisions, or officials’
inability to issue policy directives to the body (see
Vermeule 2007; Stephenson 2008).
Delegating powers to an independent body,
however, can exacerbate the principal-agent
problem – in this case, between legislators and the
ultimate decisionmakers, whether ministry
officials, the PRO, or individual producers that
depend on the structure of the EPR program. The
principal-agent problem can lead to a decision
made by an agent in good faith but in error in
attempting to fulfill the wishes of legislators, or 
by an agent that seeks to impose or fulfill its 
own view of which policy would increase social
welfare, or by an agent that seeks to further its
own interests – for example, by increasing the 
size of its department or creating a competitive
advantage for existing firms.
A range of control mechanisms or governance
structures can reduce this principal-agent concern,
including careful design of governance structures
of entities created by EPR legislation, legislative or
ministerial review, public participation, and the
courts. None of these methods is completely
satisfactory, however, as each depends to a large
extent on the information, expertise, and resources
of the body that is acting as a monitor – whether
legislators themselves, the Ministry or other public
bodies, the courts, or the public. Moreover, each
form of review is costly, both directly, in the
resources needed to understand and review policy
decisions, and indirectly, in the opportunity costs
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19 For example, South Korea has one PRO for each type of material covered by EPR; these have erected barriers to entry, leaving small
importers without the means to meet their EPR goals. The government is now attempting to address this by mandating lower barriers to
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to the reviewing party. These design elements are
crucial, however, to controlling the risks from
delegating decisions and to achieving the
purported benefits of EPR programs.
With individual forms of EPR, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to assign collective responsibility
for designing an EPR system to a PRO composed
solely of industry representatives and expect them
in turn to assign highly differentiated cost burdens
to members based on their individual costs of
abatement. Much would turn on the
decisionmaking rules within such an organization,
but assuming that decisions are made by majority
voting, innovators, almost by definition, likely
would be in the minority, outvoted by non-
innovators with  incentives to spread their higher
abatement costs across the membership of the
PRO as broadly as possible even though this
might entail implicit cross subsidies from more
efficient to less efficient members. This tendency
would be exacerbated by the need for the PRO to
deal collectively with the costs of orphaned
products and historical waste. To expect such an
organizations to adopt policies of collective
responsibility for some classes of products and
individual responsibility for other classes is likely
unrealistic. Moreover, it would be attractive for an
industry to adopt a collective form of EPR with a
significant degree of market power to deal with
providers of other inputs into the abatement
process, such as collectors and recyclers. In some
cases, such market power could counterbalance
that possessed by providers of some of these
inputs, such as municipal collection systems, but
monopolies on both the buyer and seller side of a
market may not be efficient and often lead to
bargaining breakdowns.
Similarly, it obviously would be simpler, both
politically and bureaucratically, for a government
environmental agency to deal with a single
industry organization, rather than several
competing organizations or a plethora of
individual producers. It is significant (but not
surprising) that most EPR programs in the
European Union have gravitated over time to
collective means of meeting EPR goals, often
including per-unit fees. 
In short, solutions to the design concerns
underlying EPR are likely to depend heavily on
the interests that are involved in designing and
implementing these solutions. Establishing a
system that is effective, efficient, and fair therefore
would place considerable weight on the
governance structures that are implemented to
resolve these issues, including questions of
expertise, resources, objectivity, transparency and
legitimacy, to which too little attention has been
paid in the design of EPR programs. 
EPR in Ontario: A Cautionary Tale 
EPR policies are already in place in Canada, and
their expansion has entailed much controversy. In
Ontario, for example, the expansion of the
province’s hazardous and special waste program on
July 1, 2010, caused considerable public backlash
(Walkom 2010). To help focus the discussion on
the key design elements of EPR programs, we
examine the Ontario experience, and we find that
existing provincial programs have had mixed
success at meeting the goals of EPR.
The Growth of EPR in Ontario 
Modern EPR programs in Ontario were born out of
the Blue Box program, established in the 1980s as a
municipally operated and funded curbside recycling
program for household plastics, glass, steel, paper,
cardboard, and aluminum (Product Policy Institute
2010). Concerns over the increasing cost of this
program led to the enactment of the 2002 Waste
Diversion Act (WDA) and the creation of Waste
Diversion Ontario (WDO) (see Coalition for an
Efficient and Rational Bluebox 2005). WDO was
established as a permanent, nongovernmental
corporation consisting of representatives from the
industrial, municipal, and commercial sectors, 
and the environmental community (Ontario 2010).
Under the WDA, brand owners and first
importers of designated products are called
stewards, who can join together to establish
“industry funding organizations” (IFOs), which
are the equivalent of PROs elsewhere. IFOs are
responsible for developing and operating waste
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute | 12 Commentary 316
diversion programs and funding them with fees
charged to the stewards. WDO incorporates IFOs,
reviews their proposed plans, and forwards them
to the minister of the environment for approval
(Ontario 2010). For more than four years after the
enactment of the WDA, Blue Box was the only
program in operation. Since 2008, WDO, in
conjunction with industry, has also developed
programs for waste electrical and electronic
equipment, municipal hazardous and special
waste, and used tires (Canadian Institute for
Environmental Law and Policy 2008).
The Blue Box Program
After beginning as a municipally operated
program in the 1980s, in 2004 Blue Box was the
first program to be designated under the new
WDA, and Stewardship Ontario was established
as the IFO for the program (Canadian Institute
for Environmental Law and Policy 2008). Under
the WDA, stewards are responsible for 50 percent
of the cost of the Blue Box program; thus, Blue
Box is not a true EPR program but a mix of
government and producer funding. Municipalities
are responsible for collection as well as for
contracting with transporters and recyclers for
EOL processing. Stewardship Ontario charges
producers fees calculated based on the number of
tonnes of Blue Box waste each producer creates as
well as a portion of the shared program costs.
Stewards incorporate these fees in the price of
their goods. Stewardship Ontario then reimburses
municipalities for 50 percent of the program costs
(Stewardship Ontario 2010). The minister of
the environment intends to increase producers’
contributions, eventually moving to having
stewards pay 100 percent of the EOL costs of 
Blue Box materials (Ontario 2009). 
The Municipal Hazardous or 
Special Waste Program 
The Municipal Hazardous or Special Waste
Program (MHSW) is a three-phase plan
developed by Stewardship Ontario in cooperation
with WDO. The first phase was approved by the
minister of the environment in February 2008
and implemented on July 1, 2008 and phases 2
and 3 were implemented on July 1, 2010.
20
Stewardship Ontario as the IFO charges fees to
stewards based on their per-tonne production of
the particular category of MHSW goods and a
portion of shared program costs (Stewardship
Ontario 2009a). Stewards were able to choose
how to manage their fee for these goods, and some
retailers charged consumers a separate “eco-fee”
visible only on the receipt at point of sale (Ontario
2010). However, poor public education and its
implementation on phase 2 and 3 goods
coincident with that of Ontario’s Harmonized
Sales Tax (HST) led to a considerable backlash
against the program from the media and the
public.
21 Accordingly, on July 20, 2010, the
Ontario government suspended steward fees for
90 days on goods in the second and third phase in
order to work with stakeholders to review the
program. During this period, goods were still
collected, but taxpayers shouldered the costs
(Howlett 2010a). The province eventually
abandoned the second and third phases of the
program altogether, opting instead to fund
municipalities to dispose of these wastes.
22
However, goods covered under phase 1 of the
program are still subject to steward fees and
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20 Phase 1 materials included paint, antifreeze, selected fertilizers, solvents, used oil filters, single-use batteries, and pressurized containers
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2010). In this phase, stewards paid 80 percent of the total cost of the program, while the rest was
covered by municipalities. Phases 2 and 3  added all batteries, aerosol containers, portable fire extinguishers, fluorescents, switches, and
measuring devices containing mercury, pharmaceuticals, sharps, all fertilizers, flammable materials, corrosive materials, irritants, toxics,
reactives, and leachates (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2010). With the introduction of phases 2 and 3, stewards moved to
paying 100 percent of the program costs (Stewardship Ontario 2008a).
21 For example, although the fee was released simultaneously with the introduction of the HST, none of the HST information circulated to the
public mentioned environmental fees. Public advertisements for the program also made no mention of fees (Orange Drop 2010).
22 The provincial government will provide municipalities with $8 million to aid in disposing of these items (Howlett 2010b).Commentary 316 | 13
retailers are entitled to charge consumers 
point-of-sale fees, if they choose. 
The Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment Program 
Another program, created by Ontario Electronic
Stewardship (OES) in conjunction with WDO, is
the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
Program (WEEE), a multiphase program with
five-year collection, reuse, and recycling targets.
23
OES sets steward fees based on each producer’s
per-tonne production of the materials covered by
the program as well as a portion of the shared
program costs. Industry stewards are responsible
for paying all costs, but, as with Ontario’s other
EPR programs to date, stewards have full
discretion on how to manage the fee. Many of
them again have chosen to pass the cost on to
retailers, who, in turn, pass it on to consumers in
the form of an eco-fee shown separately on receipts
at point of sale.
24 Collection is implemented
through a voluntary consumer dropoff system to
product-specific collection centres.
The WEEE program is likely to be expanded
given the Canada-Wide Action Plan on EPR,
created by the Canadian Council of Ministers of
the Enviroment in 2009, under which Ontario
committed to establishing an EPR program for
household appliances within eight years of the
plan’s adoption (Canadian Council of Ministers of
the Environment 2009). 
The Used Tires Program 
Used tires were designated under the WDA in
2003, and Ontario Tire Stewardship (OTS) was
established as the program’s IFO.
25 Industry
resisted the creation of the program, however,
claiming that the existing free market collection
system was efficient enough as it diverted 95
percent of the approximately 12 million scrap tires
generated by the province annually. Other
stakeholders were concerned that the new
program would allow industry to pass on the costs
to consumers through handling fees and that the
funding scheme eventually would subsidize tire
burning. In 2008, the minister asked WDO to
develop a revised plan, which was approved in
April 2009.
26 As with other EPR programs in
Ontario, stewards pay a fee to their IFO based on
the number of tires they produce as well as their
share of the program costs (Ontario Tire
Stewardship 2010a). Stewards then decide how
they will manage the fee; commonly, it is passed
on to retailers and then to consumers in a way
similar to the “eco-fees” of other programs (Solid
Waste & Recycling 2010a). Consumers can drop
off used or scrap tires at collection points across
the province, even in remote and northern areas
(Ontario Tire Stewardship 2010b).
27
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23 Phase 1 of the program commenced on April 1, 2009, and included televisions, fax machines, computers, printers, and peripherals. Phase 2,
implemented on April 1, 2010, added modems, copiers, typewriters, scanners, telephones, cell phones, PDAs, pagers, audio and video
players, cameras, equalizers, amplifiers, radios, receivers, speakers, tuners, turntables, projectors, video recorders, and handheld computers
(Ontario Electronic Stewardship 2010).
24 The program covers waste from the residential as well as the industrial, commercial, and institutional sectors. To faciliate collection from the
latter sectors, a list of large-volume-pickup service providers is available; some charge a fee per skid but many transport such waste free of
charge (Ontario Electronic Stewardship 2009).
25 In September 2004, WDO approved a Scrap Tire Diversion Program, which was sent to the minister of the environment for approval, but,
possibly due to ministerial turnover, never implemented.
26 The program, launched in September 2009, covers all used tires including passenger car and truck tires and off-road tires used in agricultural,
forestry and mining operations.
27 Collection points may accept up to four tires per resident per day without charge, and may impose a fee at their discretion for the dropoff of
any additional tires This restriction reflects both space limitations and a desire to discourage abuse of the program by the industrial,
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Setting Targets for EPR Programs
According to the minister’s 2009 report on the
WDA, the long-term goal of Ontario’s EPR
program is to develop a zero-waste society. Such a
goal, however, is physically impossible.
28 The more
immediate goals thus are to create programs for
categories of waste and to set progressively more
demanding target recycling rates, or “diversion
targets” within those programs (Ontario 2009).
29
Diversion targets are set for overall program
performance, rather than for particular categories
of products. For example, the Blue Box program
was given a diversion target of 50 percent for
2006, 60 percent for 2008, and 70 percent for
2011 (Stewardship Ontario 2010). As earlier
targets were actually met before the deadline, 
it is possible that they were not set ambitiously
enough. Indeed, critics suggest that Ontario
should move away from global targets entirely
since, they argue, higher levels of diversion could
be obtained by moving to individual product
targets (Waste Diversion Ontario 2008). The issue
of appropriate goals has long troubled the Blue
Box program, with decisions about what to
include in the program having to take into
account concerns about funding and compliance
by municipalities (Coalition for Efficient and
Rational Blue Box 2005). 
For Ontario’s other three EPR programs,
however, individual product or material targets
have been set by IFOs and approved by the
Ministry of the Environment,
30 although many
targets are not met – for example, less than half
the targeted amount of antifreeze is diverted.
31 It
is difficult to determine the appropriateness of any
of these targets, however, as it is not clear how
they were created. For example, in the case of the
Blue Box program, there is a lack of transparency
regarding the criteria or process used by the
minister (Waste Diversion Ontario 2005).
Transparency and accountability issues are even
more troublesome in the other programs, as
stewards set the targets themselves with review 
by WDO and approval by the ministry. Critics
suggest that the minister should provide more
information on how these targets were created 
and more direction regarding how they should 
be met in order to improve waste diversion 
efforts (Canadian Institute for Environmental 
Law and Policy 2009). Such transparency would
lead to greater accountability for target setting 
and increase public credibility about the ultimate
goals of the programs.
Designing EPR Programs
This section looks at the tradeoffs Ontario made
in designing its EPR programs - individual versus
collective responsibility, the extent to which the
producer should be made to pay, how to involve
the consumer, who should be responsible for
collection and recycling – concerns about those
choices, and the experience of some other
jurisdictions.
Individual versus Collective Responsibility 
Ontario’s EPR programs give producers (either as
a whole for a sector or as a groups of producers)
the option to engage in collective responsibility,
where the industry as a whole is responsible for
meeting certain targets through an IFO, or
individual responsibility, where a particular firm
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28 Though advocates of zero-waste programs admit the infeasibility of such a goal, they nevertheless insist that zero-waste systems are still the
best way for societies to reduce significantly the amount of waste in need of disposal (Leroux 2001).
29 Recycling rates are calculated by weighing the products that are actually recycled, and dividing by the weight of all the goods that could have
been recycled within the program (Stewardship Ontario 2003).
30 IFOs calculate these targets using the year before the introduction of the program as the base-line recycling rate and adjusting the target
annually based on the quantity of that product or material the IFO anticipates will be introduced into the market each year. The annual
amount introduced into the market is calculated by adding expected annual growth in the number of households and income and
subtracting for the expected effects of the program on decreasing the supply of these products or materials going into the market
(Stewardship Ontario 2007).
31 Data are so far insufficient to determine if targets are being met in the WEEE and Used Tires programs, but the results of Phase 1 of the
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contracts for or undertakes EOL services for the
goods it produces. The Waste Diversion Act
requires all producers of products and materials
covered by EPR programs to register with the IFO
for the product or material unless they submit an
application to WDO committing themselves to
individual responsibility.
32
Most producers in Ontario bound by EPR
programs engage in a collective responsibility
scheme whereby the IFO is responsible for paying
all costs incurred in the collection, hauling, and
processing of EOL goods. The IFO then bills
registered producers based on the quantity of
waste they produce that are covered by the
program as well as a portion of the overhead costs
of running the collective scheme. 
To engage in individual responsibility scheme,
the producer must submit an Industry Stewardship
Plan (ISP) to WDO for approval. Under the Waste
Diversion Act, WDO may approve the plan only if
it is satisfied it will achieve objectives similar to or
better than those of the waste diversion program
approved by the minister. If WDO refuses to
approve a plan, an applicant may submit it directly
to the minister, but until it is approved, producers
must still pay fees to the IFO even if they are
covering their own EOL costs.
33
Internationally, as in Ontario, the most
common responsibility schemes are those that
have both a collective and individual option for
compliance. Most jurisdictions allow choice
between individual and collective responsibility to
let market forces generate the most efficient
system.
34 Mixed systems can suffer from some of
the same shortcomings as collective systems,  such
as lower levels of “design for the environment,”
but the solutions - either increased regulation or
more complex fee schedules – work equally well in
both mixed and collective systems. 
Making the Producer Pay?
The Waste Diversion Act permits IFOs to charge
stewards reasonable fees to cover the development,
implementation, and operation of a diversion
program, a reasonable share of costs incurred by
WDO in carrying out its responsibilities under
the act, and a reasonable share of costs incurred by
the Ministry of the Environment in administering
the act. However, the Act does not mandate how
stewards are to raise funds to cover their share of
the fees. Blue Box program stewards, for example,
incorporate their fees into the price of their goods,
while in the MHSW, Used Tires, and WEEE
programs, stewards’ discretion in passing on the
costs has resulted in some retailers charging
stewardship costs to consumers as a separate
visible charge (Ontario 2008, 2010).
35
Allowing stewards to choose how they will
manage their fees gives them flexibility, which
might increase the program’s efficiency and rate of
compliance, but Ontario stewards have not always
chosen the most effective means to promote the
dynamic effects of the fee. Theoretically, whether
the fee is included in the production costs of the
good or marked separately on the price tag should
make no difference as long as the consumer has a
chance to judge the full cost of the product before
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32 The only exception is for producers of goods covered by the Blue Box program that have annual sales greater than $2 million and generate
more than 15 tonnes of Blue Box waste (75 tonnes in the case newspapers) (Stewardship Ontario 2010b).
33 Currently, there is only one approved individual scheme in Ontario, the Heating Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Institute, which
received approval in March 2010 to recover thermostats containing mercury (Solid Waste & Recycling 2010b). Others, such as Canadian
Tire’s ‘Take Back the Light’ program for fluorescents and the Rechargeable Battery Recycling Corporation of Canada’s program for
consumer-type batteries, are in the process of seeking approval (Stewardship Ontario 2009b; Canadian Tire Corporation 2010).
34 In Germany’s ELV program, all manufacturers contract for EOL services independently despite the option to form a PRO (Nakajima and
Vandenberg 2005); conversely, in Switzerland’s WEEE system, the vast majority of producers join a PRO.
35 Some critics of Ontario’s fee structure claim that “eco-fees” are an indirect tax and therefore unconstitutional since only the federal
government has the power to levy an indirect tax (Artuso 2010). For a charge to be a fee, it must be based on covering the cost of providing
the good or program. Furthermore, critics claim, even if “eco-fees” are considered a direct tax, they are imposed by fiat, which is again
unconstitutional since provincial governments have the power to levy direct taxes only by legislation, not by regulation (Alarie and
Poschmann 2010). However, similar programs, such as the deposit-refund system, have existed in Ontario and other provinces since the
1940s. For a discussion of the “eco-fee” issue, see Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (2010).| 16 Commentary 316
purchasing it, thereby sending a price signal to
producers.
36 Visible fees, however, tend to do a
better job of promoting awareness of the program
(Binkley 2008), although the Ministry of the
Environment (Ontario 2008) advocates that fees
remain invisible. International experience shows
that both visible and invisible schemes are
workable as long as they create price signals.
37
Whether particular retailers or stewards choose to
show or hide a fee might reflect their attitude
toward shifting blame for the fee rather than
enhancing its incentive effects.
More important, however, the incentive effects
of an EPR program also depend on the manner in
which steward fees are calculated. Currently, in
Ontario, fees charged to producers do not
generally vary with the recyclability of goods.
Producers therefore have less incentive to design
their products in an environmentally friendly
manner. These perverse incentives could be
eliminated by calculating steward fees based on
the relative recyclability of each steward’s good, so
that producers that send more of their goods to
landfills, or whose goods cost more to recycle, pay
higher fees. Calculating relative recyclability
would be comparatively simple for products that
are made predominantly of one material, as is the
case for most Blue Box items, Used Tires, and
some MHSW. However, calculations for more
complex goods such as computers and other
WEEE products involve high information and
transaction costs due to the plethora of different
metals, plastics, and chemicals involved in the
manufacturing of these products.
38 Ontario’s fee
structures need to be more attentive to the
individual tailoring of fees where feasible
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario
(2010)), although recognizing that such tailoring
will not always be cost effective. Instead, they have
tended toward the option that reduces the
incentive effect of the fees.
In the case of MHSW, however, the backlash
against “eco-fees” has caused Ontario to abandon
the payment system and to announce that,
instead, it will fund municipalities to dispose of
these wastes. As a result, neither the producer nor
the consumer faces incentives relating to the costs
of dealing with these products. The costs are
shifted to the taxpayer, with the funds coming
partially from provincial revenue and, where the
transfer to municipalities is not sufficient to cover
the costs of the program, from municipal revenues
(Howlett 2010b).
Why Would Consumers Participate?
Consumer participation in Ontario’s EPR
programs involves payment for the program at
point of purchase and voluntary dropoff, either in
a Blue Box or at a collection centre. With the
exception of the deposit-refund system for beer,
wine, and spirit containers, consumers have no
incentive to participate in EPR programs other
than from an altruistic desire to protect the
environment, or in municipalities with a pay-as-
you-throw program to reduce waste costs. Where
participation involves a significant effort on behalf
of the consumer, as is the case in collection centre
programs like MHSW, WEEE and Used Tires,
issues of compliance arise.
Beer, wine, and spirit containers under the
deposit-refund system have the highest
compliance rate of any recycling program in
Ontario (City of Toronto 2010). Both deposit-
refund systems and household pickup systems
create better incentives for compliance than
voluntary dropoff programs, yet three-quarters of
Ontario’s EPR systems are based on voluntary
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36 Note in this regard that fees that are identified only at the checkout counter seem an inefficient mechanism for influencing consumer
demand, at least for products that are one-off purchases or purchased rarely.
37 The Swiss WEEE program, which performs well, has a mandatory visible fee (Khetriwal, Kraeuchi, and Widmer 2009). Fees remain hidden
in Germany’s EPR system for packaging, but that program too enjoys a high level of success (Quinn and Sinclair 2006).
38 Germany’s packaging system engages in this specific fee-setting process to an extent by charging fees that incorporate the sales volume,
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dropoff. This is likely because dropoff programs
are the least costly to implement and, because of
the lower volume of such materials, have lower
total recycling costs. Again, however, these 
choices tend to reduce the incentive effects 
of the program. 
Who Collects and Recycles? 
A concern with collective responsibility schemes is
collusion among producers to gain power in the
market for waste management services such as
collection, hauling, and processing. Ontario’s EPR
program, however, gives considerable power to
WDO and the various IFOs to control the market
for these services. Under both the Used Tires and
WEEE programs, for example, service providers
(collectors, transporters, processors) must register
and enter into an agreement with the IFO to be
eligible to receive payments and incentives under
the program (Ontario Electronic Stewardship
2009; Ontario Tire Stewardship 2009).
Similarly, under the now-abandoned MHSW
program, the IFO (Stewardship Ontario) had
considerable power. Under the household
hazardous waste program, there were three
categories of transporters and processors, all of
which had to register with Stewardship Ontario.
First, transporters and processors in the municipal
collection channel contracted with a municipality
to provide EOL services for MHSW. Stewardship
Ontario reimbursed the municipality, which, in
turn, paid the transporters and processors. Second,
transporters and processors in the non-automotive
commercial collection channel contracted with
Stewardship Ontario and were assigned a number
of retailer-owned collection sites to service.
Transporters and processors from non-automotive
commercial collection sites had to report the
quantities of MHSW they managed and were
reimbursed by Stewardship Ontario. Finally,
automotive MHSW such as oil filters and
antifreeze usually were collected at service centres
and automotive dealerships. Contracts between
automotive commercial collection centres and
downstream registered transporters and processors
were negotiated between the parties with no
involvement from Stewardship Ontario. All
registered transporters and processors contracting
with automotive commercial collection centres
were eligible for transportation and processing
incentives from Stewardship Ontario once they
reported the quantities they managed
(Stewardship Ontario 2009c). It is not clear how
these wastes will be handled given recent
government announcements about the program.
For the Blue Box program, on the other hand,
municipalities are responsible for collection and
contracting with downstream transportation and
processing firms. Stewardship Ontario is not
involved in the process; instead, it compensates
municipalities for up to 50 percent of the costs.
Any producer that chooses to form its own ISP is
likely to have unique methods of contracting for
the collection, transportation, and processing of
its EOL goods.
Ontario’s EPR programs therefore provide
considerable market power to IFOs, which
essentially are what economists call monopsony
purchasers of waste services. When there is a
monopsony purchaser of downstream services, the
number of downstream contracts that are entered
into will be limited, and rival collectors, haulers,
and processors might not be able to sustain
operations while they wait for current contracts to
expire (European Union 2005). This reduction in
competition can result in higher long-term
contract costs.
39
Governance in EPR Programs
There are major concerns about the design choices
made in Ontario’s EPR program, but who is
making these choices? There are three levels of
decisionmaking in Ontario’s EPR programs:
￿ The minister of the environment: The minister, an
elected member of the provincial government, is
responsible for setting the framework for waste
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diversion through the WDA and its regulations,
enters into an operating agreement with WDO,
may establish policies or enact regulations that
WDO must follow, and designate wastes that are 
to be subject to the program.
40 Perhaps most
important, under the Act the minister is
responsible for the approval of IFO and ISP
program plans and enforcement in instances where
prosecution for offences under the act is required.
￿ Waste Diversion Ontario: The board of directors of
WDO has sixteen members, nine of whom are
appointed by stewards or municipalities, one by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and six
by the minister (one civil servant, the balance
members of the public).
41 
￿ Industry funding organizations: The role of an IFO
is to develop, implement, and operate waste
diversion programs on the industry’s behalf under
the direction of WDO. Each IFO has a board of
directors as well as officers of the corporation. In
general, boards are appointed by the stewards or
related associations – for both Stewardship Ontario
and OES, all directors must be employees of a
steward or a steward-related association. The Retail
Council of Canada has representation on both the
OES and the Ontario Tire Stewardship, while an
additional two of the sixteen-member for
Stewardship Ontario board must be independent
of commercial ties to Blue Box or MHSW waste. 
Ontario’s EPR programs, therefore, are
considerably decentralized. The ministry sets the
general framework and goals, while WDO and the
IFOs work out the details. WDO and, especially,
the IFOs are dominated by steward
representatives. The presence of industry
representatives gives these bodies expertise in
relevant products and product markets, but risks a
lack of detachment from industry interests and the
encouragement of programs that favour stewards
rather than those who might be more effective in
reducing environmental harm at least cost in a fair
manner. As part of its announcement that it was
ending the household hazardous waste program,
the Ontario government stated that it would place
consumer representatives on the boards that will
deliver waste diversion programs (Howlett
2010b).
The ministry is attempting to control the
principal-agent problem that underlies this
decisionmaking framework by requiring that IFOs
obtain approval for plans from WDO and the
ministry, but this structure provides only weak
oversight. The problem is that representation on
the WDO board lacks the balance that otherwise
might offer confidence that it is providing
objective oversight of IFOs that are completely
dominated by stewards. The effectiveness of the
system accordingly depends on the ministry’s
capacity, in terms of resources and expertise, to
review the plans of WDO and the IFOs, or its
willingness to rely on decisions made by
organizations that appear to be dominated by
industry representatives. Adding public
participation might add a further check on
industry control, but that would depend on
public representatives’ attention to and
understanding of the issues.
Making EPR Work
EPR could have significant environmental
benefits as well as increasing the efficiency and
fairness of how the end of life of products is
handled. As with most regulatory programs,
however, EPR programs risk being designed in a
manner that does not fulfill their potential and
that might even be more harmful, costly, and
unfair than more traditional waste systems. Much
depends on the governance structure.
The Ontario experience is instructive. The
minister sets targets and the general regulatory
framework, which makes sense given that the
minister is accountable to the legislature and the
public. The details are then delegated to different
bodies in order, it is assumed, to save costs and
leverage their expertise. While the general
C.D. Howe Institute
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41 The chair is designated by the board from among its members. The chair is responsible for breaking tied votes and signing WDO’s annual
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structure seems reasonable, however, the details
are problematic. It is unclear if the targets set for
the program are rational, as the process by which
they are set is opaque. Further, the choice of many
of program details is questionable. In each design
choice, the decision was made in a fashion that
reduces the incentives to take action: while the
system allows for individual and collective
responsibility, fees are set on a per-unit basis that
reduces the dynamic incentives; consumers have
no incentive beyond altruism to participate in the
program; and the IFOs essentially are
monopsonists in the market for recycling services,
reducing the efficiency of the downstream waste
processing system. Moreover, because of the
manner in which the system was structured 
and implemented, the Ontario government faced
outrage by the public over its household
hazardous waste program and was forced to
remove even the limited incentives that were 
in place.
In the light of the “eco-fee” controversy of July
2010, some commentators now suggest that the
role of government be strengthened to prevent
undue industry influence (Ontario 2010; Tabuns
2010). The focus on the governance structure is
correct, but increasing the direct role of
government is only one solution – and one that
would reduce the value of specialized expertise.
There is no reason WDO should be dominated by
parties with an economic stake in the design of
the EPR program. The plans of IFOs with steward
representation should not be reviewed by steward
representatives from those particular industries.
Further, the entire review process should be open
to public scrutiny to ensure that there is at least
the possibility of a check on capture by industry
representatives.
In establishing an EPR program, certain key
considerations should be kept in mind. First,
ensure that EPR targets are realistic so that the
program achieves a net environmental benefit;
targets should be based to the extent possible on
the marginal costs and benefits of different target
levels. Because of the lack of complete
information on costs and benefits and because of
equity concerns that are central to the creation of
EPR programs, the process should be transparent,
with clear avenues for public notification and
comment and for political accountability. Such
transparency and accountability would be
enhanced by the completion and publication of a
cost-benefit analysis for each target.
Second, allow both individual and collective
programs to operate concurrently, which would
promote economies of scale and competition. At
the same time, the system should to the maximum
extent feasible use individualized producer
payments, with appropriate penalties for not
meeting targets, rather than have individualized
plans exist as a largely unused exception to the
collective system (as currently in Ontario). 
Third, the program should be subject to the
Competition Act to ensure maximum efficiency
and environmental protection.
Fourth, the system should provide inducements
for consumers to participate in end-of-product-life
collection and recycling functions beyond
education and moral suasion. 
Finally, the governance system should ensure a
balanced representation of interests and
transparent processes for the decisionmaking
bodies so that design and implementation choices
are made objectively and credibly. EPR program
design for individual products or categories of
products should not be left only to producers or
IFOs. An independent agency (whether a
restructured WDO or an analogous agency)
should make design choices. This agency should
include industry representation but not be
dominated by producers. There should also be
effective representation of other affected groups,
including consumers, municipalities, and
environmental groups. The key should be to
ensure there is expertise on this agency as well as
independence from producer or political control.
42
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Given that competition is central to an effective
and efficient EPR program, the agency should be
given the power to monitor the program carefully,
including the ability to impose audit
requirements.
In sum, EPR programs need not suffer the fate
of the failed Ontario Municipal Hazardous or
Special Waste program. Policymakers can make
these programs work through better institutional
design, such as by setting realistic diversion
targets, increasing competition between individual
and collective IFOs, ensuring balanced
representation on IFO boards, and providing
inducements to consumers to participate in the
EPR program. Failure on these criteria may lead
to unnecessary extra costs with perhaps little
environmental benefit.
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